Recent History of Mercenary Activity

Recent History of Mercenary Activity

During the eighties and nineties there were two companies that made a name for themselves in the private military business. Firstly, there was Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African company started by Lieutenant-Colonel Eeben Barlow in 1989.  Eeben Barlow had been commander of 32 Buffalo Battalion Reconnaissance Wing in the South African Defence Force (SADF). When apartheid ended he found himself unemployed and decided to create EO to make use of his military skills. Barlow’s first real breakthrough came when the Angolan rebel group UNITA seized control of the oil port of Soyo. At the time that the port was seized a British businessman named Tony Buckingham had leased oil drilling equipment in Soyo which was sitting idle costing him $20,000 per day in fees. Buckingham and the Angolan government tried negotiating with the rebels, however, they made little progress. The Angolan military lacked the capability to retake the port so Buckingham turned to an old acquaintance, Simon Mann, who introduced him to Barlow. Prior to this EO contracts had been relatively small and usually involved training or small scale protection from cattle rustling. The contract to help Angola and Buckingham now placed Barlow in the situation of fighting against the same people with whom he had been allied when he was a South African soldier. This did not prevent him from taking the contract and has led to a view of EO being closer to a mercenary outfit than a PMF (Pelton, 2007, p. 256).

The initial contract was for $10 million and was paid by the state oil company Sonangol directly to EO. This then enabled Mann and Barlow to begin recruiting which was relatively easy given the number of soldiers out of work since the end of apartheid. Within a short period of time the operation to retake Soyo began and was over just as quickly with the successful capture of the port. EO withdrew and left security of the port in the hands of the Angolan military. A few months later UNITA had again regrouped and retaken the port. The leader of Angola, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, could see that his military required a long-term solution and engaged EO to provide training and support. This time however the contract was much larger and eventually came to be worth around $300 million over three years. By November of 1994 the actions of EO and the Angolan army had removed UNITA from all of the diamond producing regions and had forced them to the negotiating table. One condition that the rebels had specified was the need for EO to leave the country. This was backed up by the United States who threatened to deny aid to Angola unless EO was replaced, by an American firm, MPRI (Pelton, 2007, p. 260). In many ways EO opened the doors for companies like Blackwater to come along later. This is because EO was the first to publicly advertise its services without trying to mask them as something more palatable. This even went so far as an EO website featuring photographs of tanks, aircraft and combat capabilities. Furthermore, they used the media to popularise their services and publish articles sensationalising their successes in Angola. It was through these marketing methods that their next big assignment came about.

Sierra Leone was also battling rebels who were cutting off the government’s access to natural resources such as diamonds. By April of 1995 the RUF rebels were at the edge of Freetown and were looking like they would capture the capital at anytime. Initially, Sierra Leone had hired a PMF called Gurkha Security Group to provide security, however, a well planned ambush by the rebels had killed a number of Gurkha’s including their leader. The Gurkhas then decided to withdraw which meant that a replacement was needed. As EO’s contract in Angola was nearing completion it came at a perfect time for the company and provided them with a $35 million contract for 21 months work (Pelton, 2007, p. 262). Within a few weeks the EO team had secured the important diamond fields as well as large swathes of the countryside. Although largely successful, the rebels were not wiped out and were able to regroup, because President Kabbah, facing international pressure over the use of mercenaries terminated EO’s contract early, in the belief the UN was going to send in peacekeepers. Despite EO’s warning to the President that another coup attempt was likely if they withdrew the EO contract was not renewed. Some mid-level army officers colluded with the rebels and ninety five days after the withdrawal of EO the government was toppled. Renegade soldiers and RUF fighters combined forces in attacking the civilian population of Freetown in what they dubbed “Operation Pay Yourself”. Mass human rights violations occurred, with one of the most frequent being the removal of people’s hands. Kabbah then turned to Sandline International to restore order and reinstate him back into government. Singer has speculated that the reason for not bringing EO back in was due to a reluctance to use the highly publicised firm, or, a legacy of negative relationships between Kabbah and EO meant that they could no longer do business (Singer, 2008, p. 115). By March 1998 Sandline had started operating in Sierra Leone and was eventually successful in driving the rebels from the capital and in the process began building its own reputation and business.

Sandline International was formed by a former Scots Guard Lieutenant-Colonel called Tim Spicer. Spicer had served with Mann and had been offered a position within EO which he had declined because he was still an active member of the British military. After leaving the military he was again approached by Mann, this time to create a PMF that would “add a more palatable layer of Western executive management to outsource the more mercenary concept of EO” (Pelton, 2007, p. 265). Their break came from connections with Lord Westbury whose PMF, DSL, had been working in Papua New Guinea (PNG) was asked to assist with securing the Panguna copper mine. Lord Westbury passed this opportunity along to Mann who asked Spicer to contact the PNG government. Spicer carried out an initial appraisal of the situation in PNG and came back to the government with a quote of $36 million to recapture the mine and train PNG Special Forces. The government could not afford that amount so Spicer turned to Buckingham who had made considerable money from the mining rights associated with EO’s involvement in Angola and Sierra Leone. On the 7^th of February the first mercenaries from South Africa began to arrive in PNG, however, by the 19^th the PNG government had mentioned to the Australian government that it had engaged the firm to provide training. This reached the Australian press shortly afterwards and started a scandal. When the PNG military heard that the government planned to pay Sandline $36 million, the head of the PNG Defence Force, Jerry Singirok, decided to deport them and arrest Spicer. Singirok demanded that PNG Prime Minister Chan and his defence and deputy prime minister resign, however, Chan responded by sacking Singirok. Singirok’s soldiers took to the streets in support of him as the country headed towards civil war (Pelton, 2007, p. 269). This provides a very clear example of the way that a PMF can have unintended and unpredictable consequences.