Legitimacy & Norms Surrounding PMFs

Legitimacy & Norms Surrounding PMFs

The perception of PMFs as modern day mercenaries, that lack legitimacy under our Westphalian system, is a key reason contributing to their failure in Iraq. As noted in the history section, mercenaries have a long history of involvement in international affairs and as Janice Thompson has noted, it took a lengthy process to delegitimize non-state violence and bring about the monopolization of force by the state (Thompson, 1994, p. 149). This is due in part to the norms that have developed from the Clausewitzian model of the ‘remarkable trinity’ that Clausewitz claimed existed within a nation among the government, the military and the people (Grant, 1998, p. 3). This is the concept that the application of a nation’s inherent military power should remain a controlled monopoly of the state (Goddart, 2001, p. 46). PMFs fall outside this model and therefore their use of force and conduct of military activities can be seen as illegitimate. This has helped to create the anti-mercenary norm that exists today. An example of the problem that PMFs have with legitimacy was seen when militant leader Moqtada al Sadr used their dubious status in the wake of the September 16 Blackwater shootings as a reason for demanding the removal of all foreign security contractors from Iraq (IHT, 2007, p. 1). Even though al Sadr himself falls outside this model he is able to claim legitimacy due to his family background and work within the Shiite community (Escobar, 2004, p.1). Thus, we can conclude that legitimacy in some parts of the world comes from more than just an organisation claiming to represent its people. In countries such as Iraq, legitimacy comes from being seen as ‘one’ of the people that you are representing as well as from working for tangible benefits to the people’s daily lives. For this reason it is clear that contractors will never hold legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqis because they will always be seen as ‘outsiders’ who are only interested in their own gain.

Today’s anti-mercenary norm has also come about due to the belief that mercenaries are undesirable because they threaten state control by challenging their sole legitimacy and authority over the use of force as well as the fact that they are generally regarded as fighters without an appropriate cause (Percy, 2007, p. 203). This is an appropriate norm for states to develop considering the history of mercenaries. The King of France in 1362 attempted to wipe out the Free Companies, however, the assorted units united into one army and crushed the King’s feudal army at the battle of Brignais. Subsequently, the king started wars in Spain and Hungary as a way of moving the companies outside France before they could end his reign (Singer, 2008, p. 25). Thus it is understandable, from a realist perspective, that states who are already under threat from so many different aspects of modern society, would feel threatened by the rise of PMFs. Colonel Bruce Grant, who has been commenting on the PMF industry since the late 1990s, argues that a government’s military has legitimacy because the military profession is traditionally unique from all other professions because there are no comparable commercial services available to a nation’s military power and that military power is only exerted on the formal direction of Government (Goddart, 2001, p. 46). PMFs challenge this view of the legitimate use of force because they conduct some of the roles of the military for monetary gains and are “…not bound by the codes, rules and regulations that make the military unique” (Goddart, 2001, p. 46). Even though PMFs are conducting some of the roles of the armed forces, it is highly unlikely that PMFs will attain the level of legitimacy that has been enjoyed by national militaries because they “…contradict the military ethic of selfless service” (Goddart, 2001, p. 47).

It is also doubtful whether PMFs seriously challenge any but the smallest sovereign states. The costs of modern military equipment make challenging sovereign states extremely difficult because it is highly unlikely any organisation could afford a fleet of state of the art aircraft such as the F/A 22s, which would be a minimum requirement for challenging a moderately powerful government (Krishnan, 2008, p. 151). Furthermore, the export of this hardware is controlled by states. Many PMFs also clear all their contracts with foreign governments and their own government, prior to signing the contract. An example of this is MPRI who clears all foreign contracts with the State Department before signing a contract (Lanning, 2005, p. 198). Private corporations also lack the legitimacy to employ force in the way states use force. Given that these corporations are driven by profit and the biggest contracts are coming from sovereign sources, it is highly unlikely that these corporations would risk losing their legitimacy in the eyes of a country like the U.S. Thus, as Krishnan argues, rather than sovereignty being threatened,

“...sovereignty becomes transformed and more limited by the emergence of complex national and international networks of action, institutions and regulations” (Krishnan, 2008, p. 152).

With the rise of globalisation and rapid advances in fields such as transportation and communications notions such as neo-medievalism, which was largely introduced by Hedley Bull, are gaining increasing significance (Gilpin, 2002, p. 243). It is possible that the rise of PMFs is merely just the next step in the evolution of neo-medievalism. Bull predicted that the direction of international relations would move towards a system of:

“horizontal networks composed of states, non-governmental organisations and international institutions [...] (sharing) authority over individuals.” (Gilpin, 2002, p. 243).

Hedley Bull predicted five major harbingers of neo-medievalism. These trends are the regional integration of states, disintegration of states, restoration of private international violence, transnational organisations and technological unification of the world (Bull, 1977, pp. 264-276). Clearly each of these has had a significant role in reshaping the world away from the realist’s view that states are the only significant actors in international relations. PMFs apply to both the restoration of private international violence as well as transnational organisations. Thus, from a realist’s perspective, PMFs pose a challenge to state sovereignty on a number of fronts, principally by attempting to assume the role of a legitimate force which has traditionally been seen as a function or even a defining characteristic of the sovereign state. This is a key reason states have a vested interest in promoting the anti-mercenary norm.

The anti-mercenary norms were also reinforced during the 1960s and 1970s when mercenaries built their reputation as guns for hire who were solely motivated by profit. In the mid 1990s companies such as Sandline International and Executive Outcomes attempted to distance themselves from their predecessors so that these norms would hopefully not stick to their businesses as well. These companies hoped to distance themselves from their mercenary predecessors by promising business-like solutions to conflicts, however, they soon became embroiled in various scandals and were subsequently seen as being little different from their forebears. Today’s PMFs are trying, as the companies of the 1990s did, to convince the public that they are professional and reputable organisations that are a viable alternative to traditional militaries. Percy argues that because the norm against mercenaries has now reached a puritanical level which prevents clear thinking and a negative view has become so automatic, that considerations such as the necessity of use are no longer taken into account (Percy, 2007, p. 220). This is regardless of whether their use is for stopping a war or war lord, or whether it is for promoting war.

One of the main problems afflicting PMFs in Iraq is their lack of perceived legitimacy by both the Iraqi citizens and from within the ranks of the U.S. military. It is, as Alastair Finlan points out, highly questionable whether former soldiers working for money will not be perceived by indigenous people as simply mercenaries (Finlan, 2005, p. 15). In addition to this, PMFs in Iraq have suffered legitimacy problems due to their legal status of being ‘above the law’. The fact that contractors are virtually never held accountable for their actions has lead to them being perceived by the local Iraqis as foreign criminal firms who have no interest in the country other than enriching themselves (Agencies, 2007, p. 1). It can be argued that the very presence of contractors is undermining the moral authority of the occupation forces (Finlan, 2005, p. 15). These negative connotations feed into the view and reinforce the norms that have developed around mercenaries, that they are self-interested ‘guns for hire’ who care only for personal gain and will fight for whoever pays them.

The PMF industry is attempting to counter this norm by claiming that they are different from their predecessors because they do not engage in offensive combat operations (Percy, 2007, p. 225). This, however, is a difficult claim to make in environments such as Iraq because what might have been a defensive contract to guard civilians or buildings could turn into a serious incident, blurring the lines between offense and defence.  An example of this can be seen with regard to Blackwater in Najaf when they were guarding a U.S. base that was attacked by the Shiite militia. The fight turned into a lengthy battle and is discussed at length in the Blackwater case-study. Ultimately, the aim of the PMF industry is to position PMFs as businesses that are professional organisations, far removed from their mercenary predecessors and to create the impression that they are legitimate businesses. The main benefit for the industry in seeking legitimacy is that it will lead to greater profits as they will be used by more governments and organisations who might not have hired them in the past because of the norms surrounding mercenaries and the stigma attached to them. Currently, Blackwater is trying to promote its services to humanitarian organisations and the UN (Robertson, 2008, p. 1).

In Iraq PMFs have had some success in securing contracts with non-government organisations (NGOs) because the situation has been so dangerous that conducting operations without them would be too risky (Avant, 2006, p.1). While NGOs have used PMFs for security, they also express their ‘feelings of horror and outrage’ over having to work with them and fear the negative publicity that could result from their relationship with PMFs (Beese, 2006, p. 1). The other potential benefit of being seen as legitimate entities in Iraq is that they then might not be such a tempting target for the militias and insurgents. Given the numerous atrocities that have been committed by PMFs such as the Blackwater shootings at Nisour Square or the ‘trophy video’ published on the internet of Aegis contractors shooting randomly at civilians from their vehicles, it is quite likely that any hope for being seen as legitimate by the indigenous Iraqis has now been lost.

use his company is privately held. The new law means that companies would have to disclose this information if they are receiving more than eighty percent of their income from the U.S. government or if they receive more than twenty five million dollars in government contracts in any fiscal year (Wittenberg, 2008, p.1). These new laws go some way towards redressing the imbalance under which contractors and PMFs have operated for the last five years in Iraq.