Case Study: Blackwater

Case Study: Blackwater

The PMF Blackwater has become one of the best known players in the contracting business, largely through its infamous reputation as a company that has been awarded hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. government contracts while having little regard for human life, being described as “...the whores of war”(Scahill, 2006, p. 17). On numerous occasions the contractors employed by Blackwater have shown little regard for Iraqi civilians and have caused some major incidents that have derailed the U.S. military’s ‘Hearts and Minds’ campaign and led to other setbacks in the war. This has resulted in a general perception that the firm is ‘gung ho’ (AFP, 2007, p.1) and is only concerned with maximising profit at the expense of people’s lives and the overall objective to make Iraq a better place.

Blackwater International was founded as Blackwater USA in 1997 by Erik Prince and Al Clark. Erik Prince is a former Officer in the U.S. Navy SEALs. While Prince was serving in the SEALs his father passed away leaving him his business estimated to be worth over $500 million dollars. The combination of his father’s death and his wife developing terminal cancer provided the catalyst for Prince leaving the military. Following his discharge he returned home to sell his father’s business and establish Blackwater USA. Drawing on the contacts he had made as a SEAL he was able to not only build expertise and see opportunities, but to use these contacts to win government training contracts and begin building his business (Scahill, 2007a, pg 33). It is also worth noting that Prince comes from a right-wing Christian family who are significant donors to the Republican Party. This is important because it provided additional very direct connections into the corridors of power in Washington D.C. Prince was later able to use those connections to win large contracts with the military and government. It is also significant because Prince who has extreme right-wing Christian beliefs would soon be in charge of one of the most powerful private armies in the world and would be waging war in Muslim countries, in the wake of the September 11 attacks. President Bush whom Prince supported in his bid to become President has described these attacks as a “crusade” (Scahill, 2007a, p. 33; Ford, 2001, p.1). Thus it can be argued that the work that Prince’s company performs in the War on Terror may be motivated by ideological beliefs as well as profit.

On the 26^th December 1996 Prince and Clark incorporated the Blackwater business and shortly afterwards began building their training facilities in North Carolina. Their aim was to build a facility that could act as “one-stop shopping” for the various military and law enforcement units around the country (Scahill, 2007a, p. 26). In the early days, Prince and Clark were able to attract SEALs to their facilities because of their past associations with them. However, it did not take long for word to filter through to other agencies such as the FBI that a facility had been built to cater to their military and special law enforcement needs rather than a sport shooter’s needs. They even built a mock school in their facilities, “Are You Ready High” which after the Columbine High School massacre led to new contracts for Blackwater training because law enforcement agencies were eager to develop skills to cope with these types of incidents. The other significant development for Blackwater prior to September 11 was gaining a government General Services Administration (GSA) contract which meant that government agencies could procure services without having to put out a competitive bid contract each time. This meant that attracting new government agencies to their facilities was significantly easier. Thus, during the period between Blackwater’s incorporation in 1996 and September 11, 2001 growth in the business was robust but it was soon to grow at a spectacular pace with the events of September 11 and two years later the invasion of Iraq (Scahill, 2007a, p. 47). After September 11 virtually all U.S. government departments began looking at their capability in response to an act of terrorism and found they had barely been considered prior to September 11 (Scahill, 2007a, p. 42). The other really significant event for Blackwater following September 11 was the creation of Blackwater Security Consulting (BSC) in 2002. Originally the vision of CIA veteran Jamie Smith, BSC started turning a profit soon after its conception thanks to an “urgent and compelling” CIA contract for work in Afghanistan (Pelton, 2007, p. 37). The fact the contract was deemed urgent and compelling meant that it could be awarded without a competitive bid process and was thus even more lucrative than it might otherwise have been. This new consulting division of Blackwater was the birth of the company that has risen to worldwide infamy today.

Blackwater first came to international attention in Iraq because insurgents in Fallujah killed four of its contractors. Fallujah had been a city of conflict since the British occupied it in the 1920s and had seen numerous uprisings since that time. More recently, the first Gulf War in 1991 had added to the anti-western feeling due to civilian casualties from the allied air campaign. This was compounded before the Blackwater incident because soldiers from the 82^nd Airborne Division had occupied the city and setup a headquarters in one of the local schools. Soon after accusations started surfacing of troops acting in inappropriate ways which included things such as urinating in the streets and using night-vision equipment to spy on local women (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.1). Finally, during an Iraqi protest, a fight started between the protestors and the soldiers. The protestors claimed they were unarmed while the soldiers claimed they were shot at. The end result was that thirteen Fallujahan civilians were killed with another seventy five wounded (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.1). This all served to create a city that was virtually a no-go zone for coalition soldiers prior to the Blackwater contractors entering the city.

On the 31^st March 2004 four Blackwater contractors were tasked with providing security for a delivery of kitchen equipment for the catering company Eurest Support Services, part of the Compass Group, which is the world’s largest food services company. The Fallujah incident and its associated contract is a good example of the dangers that can come through outsourcing work because it shows the way people can manipulate a situation for financial gain at the expense of other people’s lives. It also highlights the risks individual contractors face when they trade their uniform for a larger pay check. The mission suffered from numerous errors and also failed to meet the terms of the contract.

The contract called for a minimum of three people per car, using armoured cars and with a heavily armed rear gunner. It also required a pre-trip planning session to ensure that all relevant intelligence and information was passed onto each team member and that they all understood important information such as the route, backup routes as well as any likely areas of ambush (Frontline, 2005, p.1). The problem with this particular mission was that it was put together in a hurried fashion with little regard for prior standard operating procedures, which gave it very little chance of succeeding. The cars the men were using were not armoured, they only had a four man team, despite having two vehicles. This meant there was no one to guard the rear of the vehicles. They also lacked any serious firepower and the men did not all know each other or have a long enough period to get to know the other members of their team before deployment (Crain, 2004, p. 1). Furthermore, the team was not able to carry out its pre-operation intelligence assessment or even obtain proper maps of the area (Scahill, 2007a, p. 99). This was a key reason for the failure of this mission. The killing and horrific mutilation of the contractors resulted in totally changing the military’s plans.

It is believed that Blackwater’s operations had been compromised from within the green-zone and that the information about the contractors had been supplied to the insurgents who were then able to set up an ambush in the most effective position (Ricks, 2006, p.31). After the contractors were killed they were burnt in their cars and then hung from a bridge that crossed the Euphrates. Images of this were captured by journalists and made news around the world. The resulting fallout from the killing of the contractors would change the military’s plans for Fallujah from a winning ‘hearts and minds’ strategy to razing the city (Woodward, 2006, p. 296). The marines, who were stationed on the outskirts of the city, began reviving plans to pacify the city and started issuing warnings to the civilians to leave and that anyone found in Fallujah would be considered an insurgent (Ricks, 2006, p. 313). This incident provides a clear example of the dangers that are involved with having forces outside the chain of command, acting unilaterally for their private gain, yet having a negative impact in the public sphere and ultimately leading to a complete change in U.S. policy. This incident demonstrates some of the main concerns with outsourcing in Iraq, in particular, lack of oversight and lack of regulation of forces outside the military.

One of the main arguments that PMFs use to convince people that they are not mercenaries is the fact that they are operating in a defensive, guarding capacity. Commentators such as Percy claim that the fact they do not conduct offensive operations is a key difference between them and their mercenary predecessors (Percy, 2007, p. 225). It is for this reason that the incident involving Blackwater on the 4^th April 2004 in Najaf, just days after the killings of the contractors in Fallujah, was so significant. Prior to this eventful day the U.S. administration had been cracking down on the powerful Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Army whom they perceived as a potential challenger to their power in Iraq. This is because al Sadr had been doing what the Americans had been unable to do: he had been providing essential services to the poor Shiites, and in the process growing his army and popularity (Tristam, 2008, p.1). Sadr was also building his image and credibility with the local Shiites through his unwavering criticism of the invasion and the continued presence of the coalition forces. Thus al Sadr had grown into America’s main enemy in southern Iraq. The catalyst for the uprising of the Mahdi Army came on the 28^th March when U.S. troops raided Sadr’s newspaper Al Hawza (BBC News, 2004, p.1). It was accused of violating Bremer’s Order 14, which prohibits broadcasts that incite violence or civil disorder (CASI, 2008, p.1). The closure of Al Hawza sparked immediate protests and gave Sadr’s supporters a rallying cause that led to his popularity increasing even further (Scahill, 2007a, p. 121). Bremer then made another mistake in arresting Sadr’s second in command, Sheikh Mustafa Yaqubi on the 3rd of April. Al-Sadr needed no further encouragement to put a call out to his followers to rise up against the “invaders” (Barnard, 2004, p. 1). Thousands left Baghdad and other areas and made their way towards Kufa which was the headquarters of Sadr and next to Najaf. By the 4^th of April the Mahdi Army was establishing itself in official buildings and taking over from local police forces. Once these areas were in Sadr’s hands the army headed towards Najaf which was home to a regional Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headquarters. Blackwater had a contract to provide security for the headquarters and had an eight-man team stationed there.  Other forces at the headquarters included a small number of soldiers from El Salvador and U.S. Marine Corporal Lonnie Young. The involvement of a U.S. soldier was also interesting because Corporal Young was on the rooftop with the Blackwater guards and asked their permission to engage targets which then placed him under their command. From a pragmatic point of view this makes sense, because there was a good chance that the Blackwater guards might have been ex-special forces. From an international relations perspective it raises serious questions about the actual function that companies such as Blackwater are playing in Iraq and casts strong doubt on their assertions that they have in fact changed from their mercenary predecessors. Furthermore, this highlights the need for contractors to be either limited to completely non-military tasks such as food service or properly integrated into the fighting force. This would require them to follow the rules of engagement as well as the guidelines or laws governing their interaction with other military elements.

Before long Blackwater and the other soldiers were engaged in a lengthy battle with the Mahdi Army. Despite repeated calls to the U.S. military they were only given minimal support for most of the battle and had to rely on Blackwater helicopters for additional ammunition and casualty evacuation (Priest, 2004, p.1). After several hours the battle finally ended with U.S. Special Forces moving into Najaf. Despite the negative image of mercenaries being only interested in money and being liable to leave a situation if it gets too messy, the Najaf battle demonstrated that companies such as Blackwater could be relied on and were not going to quit if the going got tough. A common reason given for this is the fact that most of the men present there are ex-military and still abide by the same ethos and would thus do their job as required (Pelton, 2006, p. 154). This point is missing from most accounts in the general media which tend to focus on the negative impacts that the PMFs have in Iraq rather than showing there can also be positives in using PMFs. The fighting in Najaf was represented negatively by the New York Times who saw Najaf as evidence that the Pentagon had outsourced its core responsibility rather than asking for more soldiers (Barstow, 2004, p. 1). While this may be true, it does not give any credit to Blackwater for its role in protecting the base that day under extremely hostile conditions with little support from the U.S. military.

The latest serious event involving Blackwater occurred on September 16 2007 in Nisour Square in Baghdad. Blackwater was escorting a group of U.S. State Department employees through Baghdad when a sedan approached them travelling on the wrong side of the road. There are conflicting stories about exactly what happened and whether or not warning shots were fired at the vehicle, however, Iraqi Brigadier-General Abdul-Karim Khalaf has claimed that Blackwater was firing randomly at civilians (RTE News, 2007, p. 1). By the time the convoy left the area seventeen Iraqi civilians were dead and Blackwater was once again in the headlines for ‘cowboy’ like behaviour (Zagorin, 2007, p.1). Following the incident the Iraqi government issued a press release stating that as a result of the shootings, Blackwater’s licence to operate in Iraq was being cancelled. The main problem with this was that Blackwater had never obtained a licence to operate in the first place. Furthermore, Blackwater had become so essential to various U.S. departments for their own movements in Iraq that the U.S. government could not allow the company to be removed from Iraq (Pitzke, 2007, p.1). Numerous investigations into the incident have been launched by various government agencies such as the U.S. State Department, the F.B.I. and the U.S. Congress as well as an investigation by the Iraqi’s themselves. Despite the seriousness of the incident, there has been little if any actual prosecutions or punishments of those involved and Blackwater was back conducting its normal operations six days after this incident (Tawfeeq, 2007, p.1).

This latest Blackwater incident brought the issue of PMFs and their lack of accountability to public attention even more than the previous incidents. While the two previous incidents could possibly have attracted sympathy for the PMF cause, the Nisour Square incident has served to paint them as the latest incarnation of mercenaries (Scahill, 2007b, p. 1). An image that the company has spent considerable time and effort to avoid. It has also caused the public, the media and the U.S. congress to focus on the lack of accountability of the industry. This has led to further investigations of their conduct in areas such as corruption and waste as well as prompting renewed calls for investigation into their continued use and whether or not their services are worth, not only the high financial costs but also the unintended negative consequences. Loss of trust has probably been the greatest cost to Blackwater of the whole incident. Blackwater is now required to have video cameras mounted in their vehicles and federal agents travelling in their convoys contracted to State Department protection (DeYoung, 2007, p. A01). There is now a renewed focus on contracting in general and the billions of dollars that have gone missing or been misappropriated through inflated cost-plus contracts. Furthermore, shortly after the incident the U.S. Congress passed a law that would make private contractors subject to the MEJA so they can be prosecuted by U.S. courts.

It should also be noted that the examples discussed above provide only a small sample of the incidents that Blackwater has been involved in that have raised questions about the role of PMFs in Iraq. There are quite a few other ‘activities’ of Blackwater and their contractors that have also made headlines such as: the shooting of a guard to Iraqi Vice President Adil Abd-al-Mahdi on Christmas Eve 2006 by a drunken Blackwater contractor who was then flown back to the United States and still has not faced any charges (Associated Press, 2008, p. 1). Back in the United States Blackwater has also made headlines for its role in the Hurricane Katrina Disaster and the exceptionally large amounts of money it charged the government for its services there, as well as, more recently, its purchasing of automatic weapons for a Sherriff’s Department that were later seized by Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) agents because it is illegal for individuals or corporations to own fully automatic weapons (Baram, 2008, p. 1). Stories such as these only further entrench the image that the public has of PMFs, which is that they believe themselves to be above the law and can act anyway they please (Eviatar, 2007, p. 1). It also raises questions about a PMFs right to use force rather than force being the sole responsibility of the state, as has been discussed previously.

The Blackwater case study provides a good example of the issues discussed in this dissertation because virtually all of them relate directly to Blackwater. Issues such as regulation and oversight have been a key reason for failures in the PMF industry and are demonstrated by the example of Blackwater in Nisour Square, which has resulted in more stringent monitoring of their activities. Similarly, issues of legality have also become more prominent due to the actions of Blackwater. Finally, this has led to a questioning of the real costs of using PMFs and whether the short term gains translate into the long term broader objectives of the war which has seen commentators such as Singer questioning their legitimacy for being involved in any weapons carrying roles at all (Singer, 2007c, p. 1).