Conclusion

Conclusion

The Iraq war has seen the use of PMFs expand to previously unthinkable levels of use within the modern theatre of war. Contractors have been involved in virtually every part of the war in Iraq, from supplying meals to guarding bases and dignitaries to participating in some intense battles with the insurgents and militias, with little help from the U.S. military. This represents a dramatic shift away from the established norm that only the state has the right to the legitimate use of force. This change has come about because states are now seeking to reduce costs and the political liabilities that are associated with using conventional military forces. PMFs have become an attractive option because they have marketed themselves as cost effective, financially and politically. This is because contractors deaths go largely unnoticed and they can be deployed with minimal, if any, Congressional oversight; thus making them a flexible force for operations that might have political consequences if they failed while being undertaken by regular forces. This is one of the main reasons PMFs have been used in Iraq (Avant, 2005, p. 128). However, while there may be some benefits to their use there have also been serious problems associated with their deployment. That is the reason for choosing to examine in this dissertation why the use of PMFs in Iraq has been so problematic.

One of the main reasons the use of contractors in Iraq has been so problematic is their lack of legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqi people. This stems from them being seen as modern day mercenaries who are accomplices in the plundering of Iraqi wealth. PMFs are outside the Clauzewitzian 'remarkable trinty' and lack any of the means of legitimacy that are enjoyed by other Iraqi groups such as the Madhi Army and its leader Moqtada al Sadr, who can claim legitimacy through his work to provide for the poor and his family’s history of opposing Saddam Hussein. PMFs also run counter to the norm that has developed around the legitimate use of force. This is because with the rise of sovereignty the use of force by non-state actors was virtually removed from the battlefield for many years and a stigma developed around the use of such forces. While the military became a distinguished function of government bound by ethics and a sense of duty, mercenaries were perceived as the ‘dogs of war’. The current PMF organisations are attempting to change this perception and be seen as a respectable alternative: professionals who have already served in the military and are still contributing, though this time for personal gain rather than for nationalistic reasons.

The lack of laws governing the use and actions of PMFs in Iraq has also been a key contributor to many problems that have occurred in Iraq. These stem from Paul Bremer’s infamous Order 17, that he passed just before leaving Iraq, which gave contractors immunity from prosecution. Essentially this gave them a licence to   Vice-President by a Blackwater contractor as well as the September 16 shooting in Nasour Square by Blackwater are examples of problems related to this lawless environment. The lack of legality surrounding PMFs in Iraq is similar to the political environment that exists at the international level for PMFs, where they fall into a grey area because international law only deals with mercenaries and there is sufficient difference between them and PMFs for the latter to fall outside international laws. Governing PMFs at the international level used to be quite difficult in the days of Executive Outcomes because they were able to change their base of operations relatively quickly due to their small infrastructure. Although it should be recognised that this no longer applies to some of the larger PMFs like Blackwater because they have massive training facilities and rely on government contracts for work so that they are now  more directly tied to their home country than previously. Thus, they should be able to be made more accountable for their actions, if the home country has the will to do so.

The whole contracting process in Iraq has also been riddled with problems and corruption. Given the level of involvement of PMFs in Iraq this is a serious concern. The corruption associated with the awarding of contracts has been so bad that it has been dubbed a 'second insurgency' and has led to the coalition of the willing being redubbed the 'coalition of the billing' (Singer, 2005, p. 122). A key reason for this has been the use of cost-plus contracting. This means the government reimburses the contracting company for all costs incurred and then pays them an additional fee based on a percentage of the costs they incurred.  Thus there is a strong incentive for companies to find ways to artificially inflate their expenses to increase their profits. This has resulted in incidents such as companies moving empty pallets around simply to boost their expenses and thus their profits. There has also been no effective monitoring of these contracts to ensure that these types of incidents did not occur. Departments whose job it was to oversee these contracts were severely understaffed and not ready to cope with the dramatic rise in contracting that the Iraq war produced. Monitoring was also outsourced to unqualified individuals and companies with personal relationships with the Administration, thus adding to the levels of corruption (Frontline, 2005).

Legitimacy is a tough problem which is closely tied to legality because PMFs are less likely to be hated if they are not abusing their power; and they are less                              to abuse their power if they know there will be consequences for doing so and retribution for committing crimes. The U.S. government needs to seriously re-evaluate its use of PMFs in Iraq and determine if there is a role for them and which roles currently being performed by PMFs should be returned to uniformed personnel. They also need to assess how to effectively manage and govern PMFs so in future conflicts the lawlessness that has plagued their use in Iraq can be avoided. Other factors that need to be considered are their cost-effectiveness which appears to be somewhat dubious, as well as other unintended consequences such as the effect on the soldiers of having contractors operating in the same dangerous environment, and being paid far more money to carrying out work they have been trained to do.  Finally, it might be prudent for the next President to consider changing the laws governing the hiring of PMFs by government departments so that there is increased accountability for their actions and to decrease the political advantage of using them instead of regular forces. This is desirable because presently PMFs give policy makers a way to carry out operations that might not be in the best interests of the public and so there is a need to re-establish the link between citizens of a state and the legitimate use of force. Control of PMFs must also be re-established because they operate on limited short-term goals which can lead to them making the environment more dangerous for everyone; this then undermines the government’s objective of bringing stability to Iraq.

So, why has the use of PMFs in Iraq been so problematic?  It comes down to corruption. Corruption throughout all levels of government: beginning with the awarding of contracts without competitive tendering and the role and influence of senior people in the Bush Administration and Pentagon; flaws in the actual contracts, in particular allowing for ‘cost plus’ arrangements which have actively encouraged corrupt practices in the actual carrying out of contracts. Then the lack of effective oversight of the contracts which has led to abuse of contracts and war profiteering. Where there has been oversight it has tended to be provided to another crony of the Bush Administration or favoured private contract company, so simply added another layer of corruption. The other major contributor to the disaster that has been PMFs in Iraq has been the total absence of accountability because of a lack of any laws, international or domestic, to control the actions of contractors and hold them accountable for abuse of power and crimes, particularly for shooting Iraqi civilians. Bremer’s infamous Order 17 set up an environment from the beginning of the U.S. Occupation in which contractors were placed above the law. This destroyed the legitimacy of the Coalition and totally alienated the Iraqi people. Having forces outside the chain of command had other severe consequences such as where the death of the four contractors in Fallujah led to U.S. forces levelling the town, where the military intent had been to pacify the town and ‘win hearts and minds’. Similarly, the treatment of prisoners at Abu Graib, which has also been highly detrimental for the U.S. Government because it has severely damaged its reputation and moral authority, which in turn has lessened its ability to use ‘soft power’ on the global stage. The corruption, called ‘the second insurgency’ (Kelley, 2007, p.1) added to the danger and lawlessness in Iraq and so contributed to the terrible outcomes of the war. In addition the billions of U.S. dollars lost into that morass represent an enormous loss of opportunity for what could have been achieved in Iraq.

The use of PMFs in Iraq is a modern parable in corruption. It illustrates how corruption begets corruption and demonstrates that if it is left to spread unchecked from the top down it is highly destructive and can ultimately undermine or destroy any positive efforts. Ironically, a main reason for the U.S. Government using PMFs was because their use was suppose to involve less political cost whereas they have ended up contributing, particularly through the Abu Graib scandal, to seriously damaging the reputation and moral authority of the U.S. Government and greatly weakening its position in the Middle East.